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Abstract 
 
This article considers whether greater accountability for EU supranational decision-making 
can be achieved through a combination of member states’ legislative processes and EU 
treaty-based mechanisms. The EU is formed by member states’ national consent through 
treaty ratification and a system of domestic pre-legislative controls on consent—
parliamentary approval, public consultation and referendum—which operates to limit the 
nature and extent of EU law. Using the UK as an example to compare with other member 
states, the article contends that such domestic controls are prerequisites to national 
incorporation of EU law and strengthen democratic accountability. Consent alone, 
however, does not provide an adequate basis for accountability of supranational decisions; 
EU constitutional principles of citizenship, democracy, and political rights illustrate how the 
EU fulfills a role as protector of rights. The article further argues that the EU’s protector 
role represents partial legitimacy and accountability for supranational decisions. Greater 
legitimacy and accountability derives from national parliaments’ pre-legislative controls 
under EU law—scrutinizing legislation, monitoring subsidiarity, and exercising veto powers. 
The article concludes that if these controls are exercised properly, they represent powerful 
accountability mechanisms. 
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A.  Introduction 
 
How often do politicians point to the European Union’s “democratic deficit”? In evaluating 
the press coverage, the media uses this phrase far too often as a slogan to galvanize 
popular sentiment for national retrenchment and reassertion of sovereignty. After forty 
years of membership, the United Kingdom (“UK”) is now set to hold a referendum on 
European Union (“EU”) membership. On 5 July 2013, the UK parliament voted in favor of 
introducing legislation to allow a national referendum to take place before 2017.1 Feeling 
the brunt of financial cuts, strict EU bailout terms, and the imposition of new regulatory 
requirements, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Cyprus have mooted the possibility of 
pulling out of the eurozone to save their respective economies. In such a climate, the 
doctrine of supremacy, under which EU law prevails over member states’ national laws, is 
a predictable target for the “democratic deficit” slogan. Politicians, however, have a 
responsibility to be properly informed so that they can represent and constructively 
engage the electorate. Simply stating that EU law prevails over national laws misrepresents 
member states’ consent and involvement in decision-making processes. It does not take 
into account three features of democratic accountability under EU law: (1) The consent of 
member states; (2) constitutional principles of citizenship, rights, democracy, and the 
protector role of EU institutions; and (3) the role of national parliaments. 
 
This article considers how the EU is formed by member states’ national consent through 
treaty ratification and a system of domestic pre-legislative controls on consent—
parliamentary approval, public consultation and referendum—which operates to limit the 
nature and extent of EU law. Using the UK as an example to compare with other member 
states, it contends that such domestic controls are prerequisites to national incorporation 
of EU law and strengthen democratic accountability. Consent alone, however, does not 
provide an adequate basis for accountability of supranational decisions; EU constitutional 
principles of citizenship, democracy, and political rights illustrate how the EU fulfills a role 
as protector of rights. It is further argued that the EU’s protector role represents partial 
legitimacy and accountability for supranational decisions. Greater legitimacy and 
accountability derives from national parliaments’ pre-legislative controls under EU law—
scrutinizing legislation, monitoring subsidiarity, and exercising veto powers. The article 
concludes that if these controls are exercised properly, they represent powerful 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
  
                                                 
1 5 July 2013, 565 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2013) 1169–1246 (U.K.).  
2015 Strengthening European Democratic Accountability 743 
             
B. National Consent 
 
Some scholars argue that because the EU is established by member states, which in turn 
are composed of democratically elected governments, their consent through treaty 
ratification provides legitimacy for decisions at the supranational level.2 National courts, in 
considering the impact of EU law on domestic law, have also pointed to the decisive role of 
member states as sovereign entities with ultimate authority to limit their own 
sovereignty. 3  This state-centric view conforms to traditional international law on 
international organizations, which posits that national consent forms the basis of an 
organization’s existence, mandate, and functions.4 State sovereignty and the capacity to 
enter into treaty relations are foundational principles of modern international law. It is 
precisely by focusing on the state-centric view that one can begin to understand how 
national consent forms part of the EU’s legitimacy and accountability. 
 
I. National Consent by Treaty Ratification 
 
Formed out of the carnage and troubles of World War II, the founding aim of the EU was to 
pool continental states’ coal and steel, atomic energy, and economic resources in order to 
establish conditions for peace, stability, and economic prosperity, thereby avoiding 
conflict.5 Since establishing this laudable aim, the EU has become more than a continental 
economic cooperation zone. From the introduction of the euro in 2002 to the 
consolidation of EU competences under the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 
2009, the EU now operates as a supranational organization representing twenty-eight 
member states in economic, cultural, social, environmental, and political affairs.6 National 
                                                 
2 Renaud Dehousse, Institutional Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives to the Majoritarian 
Avenue? (European Univ. Inst., EUI Working Paper RSC 95/4, 1995). 
3 See 89 BverfGE 155; see also R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. No.2 [1991] 1 A.C. 
603, 659. 
4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jan Klabbers ed., 2005).  
5 See Preamble to 1957 Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957; see also 
DEREK URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1995); see also JOHN PINDER & SIMON 
USHERWOOD, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2013); see also JOHN PINDER, THE BUILDING OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (1998). 
6 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 119, 140, May 9, 2008, 
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also TFEU art. 20; see also Treaty on European Union arts. 4–6, Oct. 
26, 2012, 2012 (C 326) [hereinafter TEU]; see also TFEU arts. 4–6 (describing expansion of EU shared and 
complementary competencies—health protection, education, culture, development cooperation, environmental 
protection, consumer protection]); see also Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen 
Confidence, Working Together to Create New Growth, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011); see also Paul Craig, 
The Lisbon Treaty: Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 EUR. L. REV. 137 (2008). 
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consent has been a key feature along this evolutionary path. All member states have, in 
one form or another, agreed and consented to join the EU, leading to the formal process of 
ratifying EU treaties. Giandomenico Majone refers to this as “derived legitimacy.”7 One can 
see this from the start of the EU as a single market with a single currency to the creation of 
a separate legal order with a political and cultural vision. 
 
Prior to membership in the EU, each candidate state must ensure compliance with the 
acquis communautaire (“acquis”) and must bring its national laws into compliance with EU 
law to meet membership criteria. A process of dialogue and negotiation takes place 
between the state and the EU, sometimes leading to opt-outs or derogations from certain 
treaty provisions. The candidate state has the responsibility to implement legislation and 
amend laws to be in compliance with the acquis. Failure to bring national law into 
compliance with the acquis has been referred to as a “deficit in the political process.”8 
Consultations with relevant national stakeholders on proposed EU legislation must take 
place to raise any potential conflict with existing domestic law and practice. These 
consultations allow individuals and groups to hold their government accountable during 
negotiations with the EU. Assuming the acquis is implemented, the next stage of consent is 
formal signature and ratification of the EU treaties. The formal act of signature and 
ratification represents a legal commitment, and under the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, the member state is bound to act in good faith in implementing its treaty 
obligations.9 This principle is recognized in Article 4(3) Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), 
also referred to as the fidelity clause.10 
 
EU treaties are international treaties that require domestic transposition before taking 
effect. This may take one of two forms: automatic incorporation or incorporation by 
domestic legislation. In monist legal systems, once the treaty is ratified, it has automatic 
effect in domestic law without necessitating incorporating legislation. Thus, Article 93 of 
the Dutch Constitution provides that international law may have direct effect and take 
                                                 
7 Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4(1) EUR. L.J. 5, 12 (1998). 
8 For example, the Polish parliament’s failure to amend the constitution to implement Council Framework 
Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, which formed part of the acquis at the point 
of accession; see Darinka Piqani, Arguments for a Holistic Approach in European Constitutionalism: What Role for 
National Institutions in Avoiding Constitutional Conflicts Between National Constitutions and EU Law, 8(3) EUR. 
CONST. L. REV. 493, 503 (2012). 
9 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also ARNOLD MCNAIR, 
THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961). 
10 See TEU art. 4(3); Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, 2005 E.C.R. I-0000 (interpreting Article 4(3) as 
entailing enforceable substantive and procedural obligations). 
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precedence over Dutch law.11 Under Article 94, some rules of international law take 
precedence over all domestic law, and any national statutory provisions that are 
incompatible with these rules of international law are not applicable.12 These provisions 
taken together establish EU law’s supremacy over domestic law. Indeed, the first leading 
case to establish the doctrine of direct effect in EU law and to refer to the EU as a “new 
legal order” was of Dutch origin.13 Subsequent case law supports the premise of a new 
legal order created by member states’ consent on the basis of reciprocity.14 
 
1. UK Ratification and Domestic Incorporation 
 
In dualist legal systems, such as the UK, a ratified treaty must be incorporated into 
domestic law by implementing legislation. Under UK law, a treaty takes effect once an act 
of parliament incorporates it into domestic law. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
means that parliament is free from any limitation on its power to legislate and cannot bind 
any future parliament, so one parliament could introduce new legislation and another 
could repeal it. Parliament is supreme in its law-making authority, potentially placing UK 
constitutional law in direct conflict with the supremacy of EU law. But parliamentary 
sovereignty remains a constitutional convention rather than a statutory provision, allowing 
flexibility when incorporating EU law. Thus, the European Community (“EC”) treaties were 
incorporated through the European Communities Act 1972 (“the Communities Act”) by 
simple assent, involving agreement to apply the treaties without having to incorporate 
each treaty provision. This avoided potential conflict and implied repeal by any subsequent 
statute. 
 
The Communities Act requires that: (1) Any future act of parliament to be construed in line 
with EU law;15 and (2) UK courts determine the meaning or effect of any treaty provision or 
EU instrument in accordance with principles set out by the European Court of Justice 
(“CJEU”), as well as following its decisions.16 Taken together, these provisions mean CJEU 
decisions on supremacy in Costa v. ENEL, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, and 
                                                 
11 Gw. [CONSTITUTION], art. 93 (Neth.). 
12 Gw. [CONSTITUTION], art. 94 (Neth.). 
13 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.  
14 See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585; see also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 
E.C.R. 1126. 
15 The European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2(4) (U.K.) [hereinafter “The Communities Act”]. 
16 See id. c. 68, §§ 3(1)–(2). 
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Simmenthal bind the UK.17 This is supported by UK case law.18 The rule of construction has 
been interpreted to oblige UK courts to adhere to supremacy where there is conflict 
between EU law and any former or subsequent statute.19 The Communities Act has also 
been identified as a “constitutional statute” not subject to implied repeal.20 In this sense, 
the UK has maintained its dualism and parliamentary sovereignty by choosing to designate 
the incorporating legislation as part of a constitutional hierarchy. Parliament consents to 
the limitation of its own legislative authority by becoming a part of a new legal order under 
the EU.21 In the words of Lord Bridge, “[W]hatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament 
accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act was entirely voluntary.”22 
 
A peculiarity of UK constitutional law makes it questionable whether, prior to any act 
incorporating an international treaty, there is democratic accountability. Who decides to 
ratify the treaty in the first place? The Crown—as represented by the government in 
parliament—has prerogative power to ratify international treaties and it is a non-
justiciable foreign affairs matter, meaning it is not subject to review by the courts. 
Technically, it also does not require parliamentary approval.23 Still, a precedent was set in 
R v. Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg24 when the 
court decided it could consider the government’s exercise of prerogative powers in 
relation to ratifying the Maastricht Treaty. The case failed on its merits due to the lack of 
ability to surrender or transfer prerogative powers by the UK government, and judicial 
scrutiny of the original power was deemed inadmissible.25 Nevertheless, it does represent 
                                                 
17 See Costa at 585; see generally Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. 
18 See Macarthys Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 199; see also Garland v. British Rail Engineering [1982] 2 All E.R 402; see 
also Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Authority [1986] Q.B. 401; see also R v. Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1989] 2 All E.R. 692; see also Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council 
[2002] EWHC 195. 
19 See the Court of Appeal’s position in relation to a statute preceding the Communities Act in Macarthys Ltd v. 
Smith [1981] Q.B. 199 and the House of Lord’s position in relation to a statute subsequent to the Communities 
Act in R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. [1989] 2 All E.R. 692. 
20 See Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, 60–62. 
21 See T.R.S. Allan, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics and Revolution, 113 L.Q. REV. 443 (1997); see also 
H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty: Revolution or Evolution?, 112 L.Q. REV. 568 (1996). 
22 See R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. No.2 [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 659. 
23 See Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario [1937] A.C. 326. 
24 See R v. Secretary of State Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Rees-Mogg [1994] 2 W.L.R. 115. 
25 See id. at 568–71. 
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concern about unfettered use of prerogative powers, and attempts have been made to 
codify their use in legislation. On 3 March 1999, the government proposed the Crown 
Prerogatives Bill to control the existence, extent, and exercise of the prerogative to sign 
treaties.26 During parliamentary debates preceding the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 
members of parliament (“MPs”) proposed formalization of prior parliamentary consent.27 
In 2004, the Public Administration Select Committee advised that the prerogatives to sign 
treaties and to wage war needed statutory authority.28 In August 2013, parliament voted 
against military action in Syria, making it increasingly difficult for the government to 
override the democratic will of the people.29 The Prime Minister declared he would not 
override parliament’s decision by exercising the prerogative power.30 Although proposals 
for statutory codification of prerogative powers have not been pursued, domestic controls 
exist in the UK to potentially limit or exclude future EU legislation. 
 
II. Pre-Legislative Domestic Controls on Consent 
 
Each member state has domestic pre-legislative controls on consent operating to limit the 
nature and extent of EU law. These vary and include public consultation, legislative 
approval, and–the most progressive form of direct democracy—referendum.31 Judicial 
                                                 
26 Crown Prerogatives (Parliamentary Control) Bill, HC Parliamentary Business, Mar. 3, 1999, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/055/1999055.htm. 
27 Tam Dalyell MP introduced a private member’s bill, the Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) 
Bill, which received its first formal reading on 26 January 1999 but failed to progress due to the Queen’s refusal to 
grant consent for debate on the prerogative power to wage war. The bill can be seen at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmbills/035/1999035.htm. See also 
13 Feb. 2003, 339 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2003) 1056–73 (UK); see also 10 Mar. 2003, 401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2003) 32, 35, 
38; see also 17 Mar. 2003, 401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2003) 703–23.  
28 HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING MINISTERIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT, FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2003-04, H.C. 422. 
29 N. Watt, R. Mason & N. Hopkins, MPs force Cameron to Rule Out British Assault on Syria, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria (showing how many MPs 
reported acting on overwhelming opposition from their constituents expressed via Twitter, emails and meetings). 
30 See 29 Aug. 2013, 556 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2013) 1425–1556. 
31 For an example, see Irish Supreme Court, Case 1986 No. 12036P, Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713, 
establishing the constitutional practice of referendums for EU treaty reforms. Section 20(2) of the Danish 
Constitution allows for transfer of powers to the EU by statute adopted by a five-sixths parliamentary majority or 
simple majority public vote. Ireland, Denmark, and the UK are the only member states constitutionally requiring a 
referendum. Referendums in France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Luxembourg in 2005 on the Constitutional 
Treaty were not constitutionally required. See Fernando Mendez & Mario Mendez, Referendums and European 
Integration: Beyond the Lisbon Vote, PUBLIC LAW 223 (2010). 
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review is also a mechanism to check executive decision-making power and scrutinize the 
constitutionality of legislative acts.32 Still, as seen through the Lisbon decisions of member 
states’ domestic courts, judicial review is not necessarily a pre-legislative control 
preventing a decision and, in some cases, operates as a post-legislative check endorsing a 
decision rather than nullifying it.33 Even where there is separation of powers between 
institutions of the state, judicial review may hinder democratic accountability by limiting 
the types of individuals who can bring judicial review claims.34 The pre-legislative controls 
which allow for public involvement either through representative or direct democracy 
offer the clearest indication of democratic accountability for national consent to EU 
decisions. 
 
Member states have used these controls where situations involved membership 
enlargement or major treaty revisions.35 While they represent a form of democratic 
accountability for EU decision-making, it is important to recognize their limitations. First, 
not all member states have the full range of domestic controls leading up to referendum. 
Although this may result in different levels of democratic accountability across the EU, it is 
intrinsic to each member state’s constitutional set up—a fact explicitly recognized under 
the national identity clause in Article 4(2) TEU and other provisions respecting 
constitutional requirements.36 Second, the exercise of domestic controls may be subject to 
conditions—such as a set number of votes in parliament—which may not be satisfied.37 
                                                 
32 See French Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitutional Court] reviews of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty under Article 54 of the French Constitution: Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 
2004–505DC, Nov. 19, 2004 (Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2007–560DC, 
Dec. 20, 2007. See also Ústavní soud České republiky dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn PI. ÚS 19/08 (Czech); Ústavní soud České republiky dne 3.11.2009 
(ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 3, 2009], sp.zn PI. ÚS 29/09. 
33 See reviews of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and Polish Constitutional Tribunal after ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty: Case 143/2010 (VII. 14.) Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of July 12, 2010; Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, 
judgment of Nov. 24, 2010. 
34 For example, Article 93.1 no. 2 of the German Basic Law restricts complainants to the Federal Government, a 
Land government, or one fourth of the members of the Bundestag. The Austrian constitution restricts post-
legislative complaints to individuals who can show infringement of personal rights directly affecting them. 
35 For example, Danish referendums on the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and on whether Denmark should join the euro, which it has not; 2005 French and Dutch referendums 
voted against the Constitutional Treaty. 
36 See TEU arts. 6(3), 42(2); see also TFEU arts. 25, 223(1), 262, 311. 
37 For example, Deputies of the Austrian parliament failed to achieve the necessary one-third majority under 
Article 140.1 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Law to demand a review of constitutionality of ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty. After ratification they filed an individual petition, which was rejected by the Austrian 
 
2015 Strengthening European Democratic Accountability 749 
             
Third, the existence of controls does not guarantee their use by the national bodies or 
institutions empowered to invoke them. This may be an issue relating to national 
democratic deficit. Finally, over-reliance on referendums by one member state may thwart 
development of the EU at the expense of all others, leaving the latter no choice but to seek 
changes through alternative arrangements within— or independent of—the treaty 
framework,38 creating a “multi-speed” Europe.39 Arguably, the UK’s recent EU legislation 
on pre-legislative controls has made the use of alternative arrangements more likely. 
Compared to other member states, the UK’s extensive reliance on pre-legislative controls, 
especially wide use of referendums, is unprecedented. 
 
1. German Parliamentary Responsibilities 
 
Germany’s Basic Law does not require a referendum to take place to decide matters 
relating to transfer of sovereign powers, integration, or any changes to EU law. It is a 
constitutional requirement that sovereign powers can be transferred only by specific 
enactment of a statute with the Bundesrat’s consent. 40 This requirement is to be 
interpreted in such a way that it covers any amendment of texts forming the basis of 
European primary law which relate to: Simplified revision procedures, lacunae-filling in EU 
treaties, competence changes whose bases already exist but which require concretization 
by further legal instruments, and a change in provisions that concern decision-making 
procedures.41 Prior parliamentary approval of two-third votes in the Bundestag and two-
third votes in the Bundesrat is required for the establishment of the EU, changes to its 
founding treaties, and comparable regulations that amend or supplement the Basic Law, or 
make such amendments or supplements possible.42 
 
In relation to ratification of the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties and domestic implementing 
legislation, German citizens have raised constitutional complaints alleging violations of the 
                                                                                                                             
Constitutional Court. Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH) [Constitutional Court], Case SV 1/10-9 Treaty of Lisbon II, 
order of June 12, 2010. 
38 See concerns expressed by EU Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services in the speech at Europe 
House, London, July 12, 2013, called The Single Market in Financial Services: We Need the UK on Board, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-636_en.htm. 
39 Mendez & Mendez, supra note 31, at 227–29. 
40 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], art. 23.1 (Ger.).  
41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 243 (June 30, 
2009), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
42 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], arts. 23.1, 79.2, 79.3. 
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principle of democracy and the right to vote.43 Such complaints, however, have not been 
formulated in terms of a right to a referendum prior to ratification, so the Federal 
Constitutional Court (“FCC”) has not had to decide on its existence as a constitutional right. 
In Obiter, the FCC commented that the Basic Law may be changed to allow for 
referendum.44 Still, in the most recent case relating to the legality of establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism, where over 37,000 constitutional complaints were lodged, 
the FCC did not elaborate on this possibility or require a referendum.45 There is a strong 
line of reasoning throughout these cases which points to pre-legislative controls through 
the Bundestag exercising its constitutional responsibilities—ensuring representation of the 
popular will, future parliaments not bound by restricted competences, budgetary 
autonomy, the right to participate in decision-making, and the right to information.46 
 
2. Polish Parliamentary Consent 
 
Poland’s Constitution requires prior parliamentary consent through statute for 
international agreements. The statute must pass with two-third votes in the Sejm and two-
third votes in the Senate.47 Nationwide referendum is an alternative to parliamentary 
consent to treaty ratification, but this is by no means the norm because the Sejm 
ultimately decides on the method of consent.48 A general referendum provision provides 
that a nationwide referendum “may be held in respect of matters of particular importance 
to the State.”49 There is, however, no clarification of what these “matters” might be and 
the power to order a referendum resides either with the Sejm or the President with the 
Senate’s consent.50 Although referendum was first used for Poland’s accession to the EU, 
                                                 
43 See 89 BverfGE 155; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 
2/08, (June 30, 2009). 
44 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 270 (June 30, 
2009). 
45 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter ESM Treaty Temporary Injunctions]; See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional 
Court], Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter ESM Treaty Decision]. 
46 See 89 BverfGE 155, paras. 56–63, 94–96; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional 
Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, paras. 210, 246–60, 375, 383 (June 30, 2009); see also ESM Treaty Temporary 
Injunctions at paras. 208–15, 286–87; see also ESM Treaty Decision at paras. 160–66. 
47 Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution] arts. 90(1), (2) (Poland). 
48 See id. arts. 90(3), (4). 
49 See id. art. 125(1). 
50 See id. arts. 125(1), (2). 
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the fact that it has not been used in subsequent EU matters—for example, changing the 
Constitution to enable extradition of Polish nationals under a European Council Decision or 
establishing the European Stability Mechanism—proves it is not intended as a pervasive 
constitutional mechanism. Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal51 indicate that 
parliamentary consent is the preferred pre-legislative control over EU matters while 
referendums are a last resort providing “social legitimi[z]ation of a decision that is of such 
great significance for the state.”52 
 
3. UK Parliamentary Approval and Referendum Triggers 
 
Until 2010, it was a matter of constitutional convention—the “Ponsonby rule”—for 
parliament to be consulted before ratification of a treaty. This rule is now enshrined in 
statute under section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (“the 
Reform Act”). 53 Section 20 provides that a treaty cannot be ratified unless: (1) A 
government minister lays before parliament a copy of the treaty; (2) the treaty is published 
in a way that a government minister thinks appropriate; and (3) twenty-one parliamentary 
sitting days expires without either House—Commons or Lords—opposing ratification.54 If 
the House of Commons decides against ratification, the treaty may still be ratified subject 
to: (1) The government making a statement to parliament indicating it should be ratified 
and explaining why; and (2) twenty-one days further expires without the House of 
Commons deciding against ratification. Should the House of Lords be the only one 
opposing ratification, the government can still ratify if it makes a statement to parliament 
explaining its decision. In exceptional cases, where the government decides parliamentary 
consultation and approval are not required, the treaty may be ratified.55 
 
Elected representatives in the House of Commons have an opportunity to scrutinize 
provisions of the treaty and raise concerns before ratification takes place. In fulfillment of 
their parliamentary duties, MPs would seek clarification and consult constituency 
                                                 
51 See K18/04 Polish Membership of the European Union (Accession Treaty), Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 
Judgment of May 11, 2005; K32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of Sept. 24, 2010; P1/05 Application of the 
European Arrest Warrant to Polish Citizens, Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision of Apr. 27, 2005; K33/12 The 
Act on the ratification of the European Council Decision of Mar. 25, 2011 amending Article 136 TFEU with regard 
to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro, Judgment of June 26, 2013 [hereinafter 
ESM Decision]. 
52 See ESM Decision at 84 (dissenting Opinion of Judge Marek Zubik (English translation)). 
53 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, c. 25, § 20 [hereinafter The Reform Act]. 
54 See id. § 20(1)(a), (c). 
55 See id. §§ 20(4)–(5), 20(8), 22(1). 
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members. But there are a number of mechanisms under the Reform Act—twenty-one days 
extension not leading to a vote against by the House of Commons; overruling a vote 
against from the House of Lords; exceptional cases category—which enable the 
government to push through ratification without parliamentary approval. Thus, the 
Crown’s prerogative is not completely under statutory control.  
 
Generally, future EU treaties and legislation are now subject to one or more 
requirements—for example, parliamentary approval, act of parliament, or referendum—
under Part 1 of the European Union Act 2011 (“the EU Act”).56 The EU Act continues to 
recognize supremacy in relation to “directly applicable or directly effective EU law,” and 
the obligation to interpret UK law in conformity with EU law.57 There is an attempt at 
reasserting parliamentary sovereignty by making the application of EU law contingent on 
the continuing existence of the Communities Act, the statute originally incorporating the 
EC treaties. Given the recent parliamentary vote supporting a membership referendum, 
parliamentary sovereignty seems re-positioned to enable future express repeal of the 
Communities Act. But the possibility of express repeal and parliament’s limitation of its 
own sovereignty are already recognized in case law, so it is difficult to see what else this 
provision adds.58 Perhaps it is irrelevant that parliamentary sovereignty is not explicitly 
mentioned when we look at the overall effect of the EU Act. 
 
3.1 EU Areas Requiring Only Parliamentary Approval 
 
A relatively mild form of pre-legislative control on consent is parliamentary approval 
provided for under section 10 of the EU Act. A motion is put before each House of 
Parliament, which agrees to the motion without amendment.59 EU areas subject to only 
parliamentary approval range from extension of free movement of services to third 
country nationals,60 to EU accession to the European Convention for the Protection of 
                                                 
56 European Union Act 2011, c. 12, § 14(2)(c) [hereinafter The EU Act]. 
57 See id. § 18. 
58 See Michael Gordon & Michael Dougan, The United Kingdom’s European Union Act 2011: Who Won the Bloody 
War Anyway?, EUR. L. REV. 3, 7–8 (2012) (arguing that § 18 does not represent a “sovereignty clause” and fails to 
explain how UK law is reconciled with EU supremacy). 
59 See The EU Act § 9(3). 
60 See id. § 10(1)(a) (relating to Article 56 of the TFEU). 
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.61 Other areas relate to changes to statutes of 
EU institutions and to the number of Advocates-General.62 
3.2 EU Areas Requiring Only an Act of Parliament 
 
A second form of pre-legislative control directly involves the legislature and a specific 
legislative act before the EU measure can take effect. The following Council of Ministers 
(“the Council”) decisions require approval only by an act of parliament: Strengthening EU 
citizens’ rights—free movement, residence and the right to vote; 63 the election of 
members of the European Parliament (“MEPs”) in accordance with a uniform procedure or 
common principles of member states;64 conferring jurisdiction on the CJEU in disputes 
relating to EU acts which give rise to European intellectual property rights;65 laying down 
the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the EU;66 altering the number of 
Commission members;67 exercising the passerelle clause in certain EU areas to change 
voting from unanimity to qualified majority voting, or from the special legislative 
procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure;68 adopting measures to take a step 
backwards in EU law regarding liberalization of movement of capital to or from third 
countries;69 replacing Protocol No. 12 on excessive deficit procedure;70 exercising the 
passerelle clause in relation to enhanced cooperation matters in which the UK participates 
                                                 
61 See id. § 10(4) (relating to Article 6(2) of TEU). Accession must be agreed to unanimously under Article 218(8) 
TFEU, after approval by member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements. 
62 See id. § 10(1)(b)–(f): Amendment to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks or of the European 
Central Bank (Article 129(3) of TFEU); an increase in the number of Advocates-General (Article 252 of TFEU); the 
establishment of specialized courts attached to the General Court (Article 257 of TFEU); amendment to the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 281 of TFEU); amendment to the Statute of the 
European Investment Bank (Article 308 of TFEU). 
63 See id. § 7(2)(a) (relating to Article 25 of TFEU). 
64 See id. § 7(2)(b) (relating to Article 223(1) of TFEU). 
65 See id. § 7(2)(c) (relating to Article 262 TFEU). 
66 See id. § 7(2)(d) (relating to Article 311 TFEU). 
67 See id. § 7(4)(a) (relating to Article 17(5) TEU). 
68 See id. § 7(4)(b) (relating to Article 48(7) TEU). The certain EU areas relate to all those provisions not listed in 
Schedule 1 of the EU Act (for example, family law with cross-border implications and the number of Advocates-
Generals). 
69 See id. § 7(4)(c) (relating to Article 64(3) of TFEU). 
70 See id. § 7(4)(d) (relating to Article 126(14) of TFEU). 
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and which do not also require a referendum;71 and exercising the general competence 
provision, also known as the flexibility clause.72 
 
With the exception of exercising the passerelle and general competence clauses, which 
also require a referendum, the above areas generally reflect the treaties’ respect for 
national identity and recognition of each member state’s constitutional requirements. 
Interestingly, the EU Act does not require a referendum for any Council decision to 
strengthen EU citizens’ rights, which is at odds with giving people more say in EU matters 
of direct relevance. Similarly, decisions on MEP elections are a matter of direct interest to 
UK citizens with the potential to increase awareness and engagement in EU matters. In 
contrast, technical areas relating to EU voting procedures and exercise of the general 
competence provision are also subject to a referendum. This creates an imbalance 
between attracting electorate interest on substantive matters and losing their interest 
through disengagement in matters perceived as technical. 
 
3.3 EU Areas Requiring an Act of Parliament and a Referendum 
 
“Referendum” is mentioned thirty-four times in the EU Act, more so than “act of 
parliament” or “parliamentary approval.”73 From this basic count, it appears parliament 
favors direct democracy as a method of domestic control over EU decision-making. The 
referendum condition requires that a referendum takes place, with a majority vote in 
favor, before an act of parliament approving an EU treaty or Council decision comes into 
force.74 Under section 13 of the EU Act, a non-partisan regulatory body, the Electoral 
Commission, oversees the referendum process. This Commission “must take whatever 
steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the referendum and how to 
vote in it” and “may take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public 
awareness of the subject-matter of the referendum.”75 This is a broad remit enabling 
setting standards for political campaigning and ensuring proper and accurate 
                                                 
71 See id. §§ 7(4)(e)–(f) (relating to Articles 333(1) and 333(2) of TFEU). 
72 See id. § 8(3) (relating to Article 352 of TFEU). But note two other methods for approval of general competence 
decisions: Motion before Parliament and each House agrees without amendment (§ 8(4)); or a statement to 
Parliament that the decision is exempt from approval (§ 8(5)). 
73 “Act of parliament” is referred to eleven times, and “parliamentary approval” seven times. 
74 See The EU Act §§ 2(2), 3(2).  
75 Emphasis added. Section 13(1)(c) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000, c. 41, (The 
PPERA) already requires the Electoral Commission to promote public awareness of the institutions of the EU. 
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dissemination of referendum issues.76 To improve public understanding and engagement 
with EU affairs, there is a need for stronger monitoring and enforcement by the Electoral 
Commission—investigating and sanctioning referendum campaigns which misrepresent 
issues or mislead the public hindering access to relevant information and informed choice 
in voting.77 
 
The following areas require both an act of parliament and a referendum: Treaty revisions 
relating to the TEU or Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”);78 
amendment of the TFEU under the simplified revision procedure;79 extension of an existing 
EU competence—exclusive, shared, or supporting—or conferral of a new one;80 and 
changes to a voting procedure—especially from unanimity to qualified majority voting, or 
from special legislative procedure to ordinary legislative procedure—relating to specific 
areas.81 There are also wide policy areas subject to referendum as these are of national 
                                                 
76 Under the PPERA the Electoral Commission has wide ranging powers: Section 6B observations of working 
practices by representatives of the Commission; Section 6C and 6D accredited election observers; Section 8 
powers regarding elections exercisable on recommendation of the Commission; Section 11 broadcasters to have 
regard to Commission’s views on party political broadcasts.  
77 Sections 125–27 of the PPERA set general restrictions on publication of promotional material and campaign 
broadcasts but not in relation to the accuracy of information.  
78 See The EU Act § 2(1) (relating to Article 48(2)–(5) of TEU). 
79 See id. § 3(1) (relating to Article 48(6) of TEU). 
80 See id. § 4(1)(a)–(j) (relating to Articles 3, 4 and 6 of TFEU).  
81 See id. § 4(1)(k)–(m) (relating to TEU provisions: Article 7(2) (serious and persistent breach determination by 
European Council); Article 14(2) (European Parliament composition); Article 15(4) (European Council consensus 
decisions); Article 17(5) (Commissioners); Article 19(2) (Judges and Advocates-General of the Court); Article 22(1) 
(EU strategic interests and objectives); Chapter 2 of Title V (CFS policy); Article 48(3), (4), (6) and (7) (treaty 
revision procedures); Article 49 (EU membership application); Article 50(3) (European Council decision extending 
treaties’ application for withdrawing state)). TFEU provisions: Article 19(1) (measures against sexual, racial or 
ethnic, religious, age or sexual orientation discrimination); Article 21(3) (social security or social protection 
measures); Article 22(1) (non-national EU citizens standing and voting in state of residence local elections); Article 
22(2) (same persons standing and voting in European Parliament elections in state of residence); Article 25 
(strengthening EU citizens’ rights); Article 77(3) (passports, identity cards, residence permits etc.); Article 82(2)(d) 
(minimum rules on criminal procedure); Article 83(1) (decision on other areas of crime); Article 86(1) and (4) 
(European Public Prosecutor’s Office); Article 87(3) (police cooperation); Article 89 (cross-border operation by 
competent authorities); Article 113 (harmonization of indirect taxes); Article 115 (approximation of national laws 
affecting internal market); Article 121(2) (broad guidelines of economic policies); Article 126(14) (replacing 
protocol on excessive deficit procedure); Article 127(6) (conferral on European Central Bank prudential 
supervision tasks); Article 153(2)(b) (working conditions, social security etc.); Article 155(2) (agreements at EU 
level between management and labor); Article 192(2) (adoption of certain environmental measures); Article 
194(3) (energy measures of a fiscal nature); Article 203 (association of countries and territories with the EU); 
Article 218(8) (certain international agreements); Art. 222(3) (implementation of solidarity clause having defense 
implications); Article 223(1) (uniform procedures for elections to European Parliament); Article 311 (own 
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concern and the UK wants to maintain control—such policy areas include social policy, 
common defense, participation in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, environment, 
EU finance, enhanced cooperation, and border control.82 
 
4. Problems with Over-Reliance on Referendum 
 
The UK’s referendum requirement covers broad EU areas relating to the full range of EU 
institutions’ competences. There is concern for future treaty provision changes to alter the 
balance of power between EU and member state competences, as well as the possibility of 
majority rule in decision-making. In particular, any changes allowing Council decisions to be 
made by qualified majority voting instead of unanimity are subject to an act of parliament 
and referendum. This, however, is overly cautious and unnecessary to preserve the 
balance of power. 
 
For example, under Article 7(2) TEU, the European Council may unanimously determine a 
serious and persistent breach by a member state of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights.83 The Council can then act by qualified majority 
voting under Article 7(3) TEU to suspend certain membership rights for the offending 
state.84 The passerelle clause under Article 48(7) TEU cannot be invoked to change voting 
procedures under Articles 7(2) and 7(3) as this is excluded under Article 353 TFEU.85 Plus, 
there is no need to bypass the offending state’s negative vote because they are barred 
from voting under Article 354 TFEU.86 A number of safeguards prevent abuse of serious 
breach determinations: Involvement of political and legislative institutions such as the 
European Council, the Council, and the European Parliament; setting voting procedures for 
each institution; voting procedures which cannot be changed; and the obvious political and 
diplomatic fallout for EU integration. Despite this, section 6(5)(b) Schedule 1 Part 1 of the 
EU Act makes such voting procedure change dependent on an act of parliament and a 
                                                                                                                             
resources decisions); Article 312(2) (multi-annual financial framework); Article 332 (expenditure on enhanced co-
operation to be borne by member states other than those participating); Article 333(1) and (2) (enhanced co-
operation); Article 346(2) (changes to list of military products exempt from internal market provisions); Article 
352(1) (measures to attain EU objectives where treaties do not provide necessary powers). 
82 See generally The EU Act § 6(5). 
83 See TEU art. 7(2). 
84 See id. art. 7(3). 
85 See TFEU art. 353. 
86 See id. art. 354. 
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referendum.87 Another example of overly cautious domestic controls is the requirement 
for both prior parliamentary approval and referendum to change voting procedures under 
Article 48(7) TEU and the exercise of EU competence under Article 352 TFEU. 
 
Extensive use of referendums represents an absolutist notion of democratic legitimation 
through direct public voting. Referendums on EU voting procedures are clumsy brakes on 
internal operational rules that hinder efficient decision-making. Even in Germany, with a 
developed understanding of democratic participation through a constitutionally protected 
right to vote and state organs’ legitimacy derived from that right, the absolutist notion is 
rejected. 
 
In the ESM Treaty Decision, the German FCC deemed inadmissible constitutional 
complaints of breach of the right to vote if budgetary decisions are made by the Bundestag 
committee as opposed to the Bundestag plenary session, or if internal decisions of state 
organs are not subject to majority vote. Such internal procedures do not per se breach the 
principle of democracy or the right to vote. The right to vote is protected: 
 
only to the extent that it is in danger of being rendered 
ineffective in an area that is essential for the political 
self-determination of the people—for example, if the 
democratic self-government of the people is 
permanently restricted in such a way that vital political 
decisions can no longer be made independently.88 
 
By analogy, EU internal voting procedures are agreed on by representatives of member 
states to enable effective decision-making at the Council level. Subjecting these procedures 
to national referendums is to present citizens with a hollow sense of empowerment; that 
by casting a vote they somehow hold the EU accountable. It is far more important to hold 
governments and EU institutions accountable by having access to information on 
government voting positions and the basis for these, as well as a right to vote on 
substantive matters. 
 
The UK’s referendum condition goes beyond what some of the more active legislatures in 
member states are required to do.89 It may allay public concern at increased powers of EU 
                                                 
87 See The EU Act § 6(5)(b), sch. 1. 
88 See ESM Treaty Temporary Injunctions, Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Sept. 12, 2012); see also ESM Treaty Decision, 
Case No. 2BvR 1390/12 (Mar. 18, 2014), at paras. 124–28. 
89 In Germany only prior legislative approval is necessary for participation in decisions under Article 48(7) TEU and 
Article 352 TFEU; see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 
409 (June 30, 2009), 
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institutions and politicians’ fickleness in reneging on referendum promises for significant 
transfer of sovereignty.90 But, by setting a wide referendum trigger, it achieves the 
opposite effect of democratic accountability. Voting on technical areas inconsequential to 
UK constitutional law may lead to voter apathy, low turnouts, and further distancing from 
EU matters.91 Formulation of the referendum question and the information available will 
be crucial to ensuring public understanding.92 
 
C. Constitutional Principles 
 
National consent on its own does not provide an adequate basis for accountability of 
supranational decisions. For this, we must look to EU constitutional principles. While there 
is no formal document referred to as the “EU Constitution,” the founding treaties are now 
consolidated into the TEU and the TFEU (“Treaties”). These Treaties contain principles 
forming the basis for the EU’s continuation, representing constitutional principles.93 As a 
properly functioning and justifiable legal order, the EU must remain accessible, applicable 
and effective.94 Accessibility means the law should be practicable and available to the 
public in a form that is clear. This can range from seeking national approval and correct 
transposition into domestic law to accurate translation of EU legislation into the 
                                                                                                                             
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. Contrast 
with the Czech Republic, which does not require prior parliamentary approval for use of Article 352 TFEU or 
Article 48(7) TEU; Ústavní soud České republiky dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court] [Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn PI. ÚS 19/08, paras. 150, 165 (Czech). 
90 The UK government reneged on an election promise to hold a referendum on the proposed 2004 Constitution 
Treaty. This was unsuccessfully challenged in R (Wheeler) v. Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 
(Admin). On 16 July 2008, the UK ratified the watered down version of a constitution under the Lisbon Treaty 
without holding a referendum. 
91 UK turnout at the June 2009 European Parliamentary elections was thirty-four-point-five percent compared to 
forty-three percent across the EU as a whole. Historically, UK turnouts tend to be lower than the EU average as 
well as being lower than other types of election in the UK. See The European Parliamentary and Local Government 
Elections June 2009: Report on the Administration of the 4 June 2009 Elections (The Electoral Commission: 
October 2009), 24–26, 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/81483/047-elections-report-
final-web.pdf. 
92 For example, see concerns about rules governing referendum campaigns in Ireland, Mendez & Mendez, supra 
note 31, at 227. 
93 See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin Von Bogdandy & J. Bast eds., 2009); Craig, supra note 6. 
94  See S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (Apr. 12, 2008), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; see also Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01, and C-139/01, Rechnungshof v. 
Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others and Christa Neukomm and Joseph Lauermann v. Österreichischer 
Rundfunk, 2003 E.C.R. I-5014. 
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appropriate language of the member state.95 Applicability means the law must be relevant 
and valid to a given situation in a member state without necessarily requiring domestic 
implementation.96 Effectiveness involves making the law justiciable so that EU citizens 
have domestic remedies for breaches of law or violations of rights. 97 Accessibility, 
applicability and effectiveness can be seen through constitutional principles of citizenship, 
political rights and democracy.98 
 
I. The Concept of Citizenship and Rights 
 
The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (i.e. the TEU) introduced the concept of EU citizenship for 
the first time.99 The EU took on a distinctly political and cultural character by defining a 
geographical area consisting not only simply of member states but also of citizens. The 
Treaties subsequently developed the meaning of citizenship from the “four freedoms”—
namely, the movement of persons, goods, capital, and services—espoused in the original 
treaties.100 Under Article 20(1) TFEU, citizenship means every person who is a national of a 
member state is also a citizen of the EU.101 While nationality is a matter for each member 
state to determine, once recognized, the individual automatically has EU citizenship.102 
Every EU citizen has the following rights: to move and reside in another member state; to 
vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and European Parliamentary elections; to 
diplomatic and consular protection in a third state where their state of nationality has no 
                                                 
95 See TEU art. 12; see also TFEU art. 197(1)–(2); see also TEU protocol no. 1; Regulation 1049/2001 (public access 
to EU institutions’ documents): Recital 15, Arts. 2(1), 14(2); Art. 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
96 See TFEU arts. 18, 21, 28, 30, 34, 35, 49, 56, 110. 
97 See direct effect in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.; 
incidental direct effect in C-194/94, CIA Security International, 1996 E.C.R. I-2201; indirect effect in Case 14/83 
Von Colson and Kamann, 1984 E.C.R. 1891; and state liability in Case C-6 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5357. 
98 See Michael Dougan, The Constitutional Dimension to the Case of Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613 (2006); 
see also Neil MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the European Commonwealth, 16 L. & PHIL. 
331 (1997). For a contrasting view that citizenship has had “integrative” rather than “constitutive” effects see Jo 
Shaw, Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism, in THE EVOLUTION OF 
EU LAW 608–09 (Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca eds., 2011). 
99 See TEU art. 9; see id. Preamble; see also TFEU art. 20(1). 
100 See id. art. 45(1) (freedom of movement for workers); see also Title II TFEU (free movement of goods); see also 
TFEU art. 63(1) (movement of capital); see also TFEU art. 56 (freedom to provide services). 
101 See TFEU art. 20(1). 
102 See Case C-369/90, 1992 E.C.R. I-4239; see also Case C-135/08, Rottman v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449. 
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representation; and to petition the European Parliament, apply to the European 
Ombudsman, and address EU institutions and advisory bodies. 103  These rights are 
replicated under Articles 39 to 46 on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (“the Charter”).104  
 
Citizenship and rights are part of the foundation for creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe. Articles 1, 3(2), and 3(5) TEU refer to the “citizen.”105 Article 1 
identifies the TEU as marking “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as 
closely as possible to the citizen.”106 Under Article 3(2), EU citizens have “an area of 
freedom, security, and justice without internal frontiers, in which free movement of 
persons is ensured.”107 Article 3(5) obliges the EU to protect its citizens in relations with 
non-member states.108 From these three provisions, it is clear that the status of citizen 
confers certain discernible rights: transparency and accountability of decision-making; 
access to an area where there is free movement; and diplomatic and consular protection. 
These rights are all predicated on the individual and there is a sense of individualism in the 
values and principles espoused under the Treaties.109 The principle of democracy, as 
envisaged under the Treaties, is the basis for understanding EU citizens’ individual political 
rights. 
 
II. The Principle of Democracy and Political Rights 
 
Democracy is a founding value and principle enumerated throughout the Treaties.110 The 
EU is founded on representative democracy and Title II of the TEU devotes a section to 
“Provisions on Democratic Principles.”111 Looking at these provisions, it becomes clear that 
                                                 
103 See TFEU arts. 20(2), 21–24. 
104 See The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 39–46, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
[hereinafter The Charter]. 
105 See TEU arts. 1, 3(2), (5). 
106 See id. art. 1. 
107 See id. art. 3(2). 
108 See id. art. 3(5). 
109 See id. Preamble, Arts. 1, 3(2); see also TFEU arts. 20(1), 20(2)–24; see also The Charter Preamble. 
110 See TEU Preamble arts. 2, 9–12.  
111 See TEU art. 10(1). 
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“peoples” and “individuals” are complementary categories: Peoples of the Union are the 
peoples of each member state and individuals are EU citizens.112 This has been referred to 
as a “dual structure of democratic legitimation” whereby the EU is accountable to both 
individuals and peoples.113 Under Article 10(2) TEU, citizens are directly represented in the 
European Parliament.114 MEPs are representatives of EU citizens and are elected once 
every five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.115 Also under Article 
10(2) TEU, peoples of member states are represented in the European Council by their 
heads of state or government and in the Council by their governments, which are 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national parliaments or citizens.116 
The role of national parliaments is also seen as a fundamental principle of democracy 
under Article 12 TEU.117 
 
So EU decision-making and functioning is on the basis of representative democracy with 
direct and indirect links to individual citizens in member states. These links can be seen 
through the exercise of political rights and operations of EU institutions. 
 
1. Right of Participation 
 
Apart from democratic participation, which takes place at the national level, there is an 
additional layer of participation operational at the EU level. Every EU citizen has the right 
to participate in the democratic life of the EU.118 Participation is on the basis of equality 
and transparency. In all its activities, the EU is obliged to observe the principle of equality 
of its citizens, and EU institutions must treat citizens equally.119 This principle is not 
restricted to individuals. Representative associations must also be given the opportunity to 
make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of EU action.120 Popular vote 
                                                 
112 See id. arts. 9–12. 
113 Armin Von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU 
Treaty for International Organisations, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 322 (1998). 
114 See TEU art. 10(2). 
115 See id. arts. 14(2)–14(3). 
116 See id. art. 10(2). 
117 See id. art. 12. 
118 See id. art. 10(3). 
119 See id. art. 9. 
120 See id. art. 11(1). 
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decision-making is also considered part of democratic participation; for example, if there 
are at least one million EU citizens who are nationals of a significant number of member 
states, they can propose new legislation to the European Commission (“the 
Commission”).121 This is similar to UK e-petitions requiring 100,000 signatures for an issue 
to be considered for debate in the House of Commons.122 Since 1 April 2012, Regulation 
No. 211/2011 applies setting rules and procedures for popular vote decision-making.123 A 
working group of experts was established in 2011 to exchange views, know-how, and best 
practice on the tasks to be carried out by the member states.124 
 
To date, the Commission has received twenty-seven requests to register proposed 
initiatives on unconditional basic income, high-quality education for all, media pluralism, 
and voting rights.125 Right2Water, under the slogan “water is a public good, not a 
commodity,” was the first citizen-based initiative to achieve one million signatures for 
legislation to implement and to promote the right to water and sanitation as an essential 
public services for all.126 Although this citizen-based initiative attracted enough support 
across member states to place it on the Commission’s agenda, it ultimately failed to 
convince the Commission of the need for legislative reform. Campaigners were misguided 
in their understanding of existing EU legislation in calling for water services to be exempt 
from internal market liberalization rules when water services were already exempt as 
“services of general economic interest.”127 A recent pro-life and anti-abortion citizens’ 
initiative, “One of Us,” called for the EU to “ban and end the financing of activities which 
presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, 
                                                 
121 See id. art. 11(4). 
122 This is a government initiative and is not provided for under statute. Ten thousand signatures get a response 
from the government. One hundred thousand signatures mean the petition will be considered for debate in 
Parliament. See Petition Parliament and the Government, GOV.UK (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/petition-government. 
123 Commission Regulation No. 211/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 65), recitals 5–6, arts. 3(4), 7(2) (voting requirements); 3(2), 
4, 5, 8, 9 (organizers’ duties); 8 (certification duties of member states); 10–11 (Commission’s duties). 
124 See the expert group’s report of Dec. 2, 2014, MEETING OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON THE CITIZENS' INITIATIVE, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/legislative-framework. 
125 See European Commission, Under Article 25 TFEU: On Progress Towards Effective EU Citizenship 2011–2013, at 
7–8, COM (2013) 270 final (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Article 25 Report]. 
126  European Citizens’ Initiative Hits 1 Million Signatures, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Feb. 11, 2013), 
www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-107_en.htm; see also Water and Sanitation are a Human Right!, 
www.right2water.eu/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2015). 
127 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the 
Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376), art. 17(1)(d). 
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development aid and public health.”128 The Commission rejected this one as well.129 These 
initiatives illustrate both the limitations of popular vote decision-making where there is 
lack of understanding of EU law and the potential for initiatives to be hijacked by narrow 
political interests. 
 
The right to participate includes being able to inform, debate, and vote on European 
issues. Awareness and understanding of European issues is stimulated through open and 
transparent discussion, access to information and active engagement. Recent CJEU 
decisions have upheld the right of citizens and national parliamentarians to access 
information regarding member states’ negotiating positions and proposals for legislative 
amendments.130 It is also the responsibility of EU institutions and stakeholders to create 
political awareness and inform the public.131 According to Article 10(4) TEU, political 
parties at the European level contribute to forming political awareness and to expressing 
the will of citizens of the Union. How do political parties create awareness? MEPs should 
be properly informed on EU affairs and debates of the European Parliament. They must 
then properly and accurately convey and disseminate such information to EU citizens. 
Evidence suggests otherwise: Sixty-eight percent of EU citizens do not feel sufficiently 
informed, and seventy-four percent of people with a negative view of the EU admit that 
they are not well informed.132 TV is the most popular medium for dissemination of 
information, but “national TV channels often report on European topics from a national 
point of view for a national audience.”133 The Commission recognizes that “providing 
citizens with information about European issues from a European point of view, but also 
                                                 
128 Communication from the Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative “One of Us,” at 15, COM (2014) 355 
final (May 28, 2014). 
129 Id. at 17–19. The Commission concluded legislative amendments were not necessary because: (1) The 2012 
Financial Regulation complies with EU primary legislation protecting human dignity, the right to life, and the right 
to the integrity of the person; (2) the 2013 Horizon 2020 Regulation provisions on human embryonic stem cell 
research comply with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and (3) the 
existing legal framework for development cooperation enables managing development funding in a way that 
helps minimize abortions in developing countries, and a funding ban would undermine other objectives, such as 
maternal health. See id. 
130 C-280/11P, Council v. Access Info Europe (Oct. 17, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu; Case C-350/12P, Council 
v. in ’t Veld (July 3, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu. 
131 See TEU art. 10(4). 
132 See European Commission, EU Citizenship Report 2013, at 24, COM (2013) 269 final (May 8, 2013) [hereinafter 
EU Citizenship Report 2013]. 
133 Id. 
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from a range of national perspectives from other member states, could increase the 
European public space and contribute to a more informed democratic debate.”134 
 
2. Transparency and Accountability of Decision-Making 
 
Transparency of decision-making is upheld by EU decisions being taken as openly and as 
closely as possible to the citizens.135 EU institutions are obliged to maintain an open, 
transparent, and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.136 The 
Commission has a particular responsibility to ensure EU actions are coherent and 
transparent by carrying out broad consultations with parties concerned.137 There are a 
number of specific treaty provisions that give effect to transparency. Article 16(8) TEU 
requires the Council to meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative 
act.138 There is a general obligation for EU institutions to provide reasons for their 
decisions;139 this is supported by the right to good administration under Article 41 of the 
Charter.140 EU decisions are subject to judicial review under Article 263 TFEU, and in a 
number of cases the CJEU has found an EU institution to lack competence, infringe a treaty 
rule, or misuse its powers.141 
 
Under Article 296 TFEU, decisions on new legislation must be based on stated reasons.142 
With the prerogative to initiate new legislation, the Commission is obliged to explain and 
justify the need and relevance of proposed legislative acts.143 If the flexibility clause under 
                                                 
134 Id. at 24–25. 
135 See TEU art. 10(3). 
136 See id. art. 11(2). 
137 See id. art. 11(3). 
138 See id. art. 16(8). 
139 Case T-85/94, Eugénio Branco v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-45. 
140 The Charter art. 41. 
141 See TFEU art. 263. See also Case C-327/91, France v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. I-1409 (finding that the Commission 
lacked competence to conclude an international agreement); Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. 
Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063 (finding that the Commission decision violated a procedural requirement to allow right 
of reply); Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council Case, 1976 E.C.R. 1395 (finding that the Council of Ministers’ decision 
to appoint a principal administrator was a misuse of powers). 
142 See TFEU art. 296. 
143 See TEU protocol no. 2. 
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Article 352 TFEU is invoked to introduce new legislation, it must inform national 
parliaments of such proposals to enable subsidiarity monitoring under Article 5(3) TEU and 
Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
(“Protocol No. 2”).144 
 
The Commission has an obligation to provide reasoned opinions prior to enforcement 
action against member states for breach of treaty obligations. In the reasoned opinion of 
June 2013, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Portugal, and Romania were directed to 
comply with Directive 2009/119/EC to maintain minimum stockpiles of crude oil.145 In 
these instances, an administrative stage allows for the alleged offending state to negotiate 
and exchange opinions with the Commission prior to the commencement of legal 
proceedings.146 If the state fails to comply, the Commission must satisfy procedural justice 
by producing a reasoned opinion setting out the grounds of complaint to enable the state 
to prepare a defense and rectify the breach within a timeframe.147 On occasion, the 
Commission has been in breach of procedural justice by commencing proceedings after the 
member state complied with the reasoned opinion.148 
 
The right of EU citizens to complain to the European Ombudsman (“the Ombudsman”) 
about maladministration in the activities of EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies is 
a means of raising transparency and accountability issues.149 The most common focus of 
the Ombudsman’s inquiries is lack of transparency in EU administration. In 2012, twenty-
one and a half percent of cases were transparency-related, as compared with thirty-three 
percent in 2010 and twenty-five percent in 2011.150 In relation to the right to petition the 
                                                 
144 See TFEU art. 352(2); TEU protocol no. 2. 
145 See June 2013: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Portugal, and Romania Are Called Upon to Comply with EU 
Rules on Oil Stocks, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/june-2013-belgium-
cyprus-czech-republic-portugal-and-romania-are-called-upon-comply-eu-rules-oil (last visited Aug. 3, 
2015); see also June Infringements Package: Main Decisions, European Commission 7 (June 20, 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/MEMO-13-583_EN.pdf. 
146 See TFEU art. 258. The Commission will attempt to resolve matters informally. If the matters remain 
unresolved, the Commission will issue a letter of formal notice requesting a response from the member state. 
147 See Case C-1/00, Comm’n v. France, 2001 E.C.R. I-9989, para. 54; Case C-230/99, Comm’n v. France, 2001 
E.C.R. I-1169, para. 31. 
148 Case C-439/99, Comm’n v. Italy, 2002 E.C.R. I-305, para. 17; Case C-362/90, Comm’n v. Italy, 1992 E.C.R. I-
02353, para. 9. 
149 See TFEU art. 228; 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 7. 
150 See 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 7. 
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European Parliament, one of the most common subject matters for petitions is 
fundamental rights and justice.151 
 
III. EU as Protector of Rights 
 
EU institutions have a monitoring and legislative role in relation to rights, enabling 
consistency and uniformity in application and implementation. Because these rights derive 
from the Treaties, it also makes sense to have supranational oversight. Thus, decision-
making authority derives from upholding and protecting rights, representing Majone’s 
“autonomous legitimacy” argument.152 There are various examples of the protector role 
under the Treaties. 
 
1. Oversight Responsibilities of the Commission 
 
As an impartial supranational body, to the extent that it is not composed of member state 
representatives, the Commission can be seen in its key role of standard-setting across the 
EU. It is entrusted with several oversight responsibilities. First, it promotes the general 
interest of the EU, takes appropriate initiatives to that end, and ensures application of the 
Treaties and measures adopted by EU institutions. This includes overseeing the application 
of EU law under the control of the CJEU.153 Second, it oversees the application of 
citizenship and rights throughout the EU. Every three years, it must compile a report on the 
application of citizenship and rights for the European Parliament and Council. On the basis 
of this report, the Council may adopt provisions to strengthen or add to rights in Article 
20(2) TFEU.154 Third, it steers EU-wide standard-setting by making legislative proposals that 
may become legislative acts adopted by the European Parliament and Council.155 
 
The Commission’s 2013 Report points to areas of concern for application of citizenship 
rights. In relation to electoral rights, the Commission has pursued dialogues with member 
states regarding transposition of Directive 94/80/EC, the right of EU citizens to participate 
in municipal elections, and Directive 93/109/EC, the right of EU citizens to participate in 
European elections.156 As a result, the member states concerned amended their legislation 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 See Majone, supra note 7, at 20–24. 
153 See TEU art. 17(1). 
154 See TFEU art. 25. 
155 See TEU art. 17(2). 
156 See 2013 Article 25 Report, supra note 125, at 6.  
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or announced amendments to comply with EU law.157 Eleven member states were 
contacted about not allowing non-national EU citizens to found or become members of 
political parties, contrary to Article 22 TFEU.158 While four member states clarified the 
situation, adopted national legislation in line with EU law, or announced amendments, the 
Commission took action against the seven remaining member states.159 The Commission 
recommends member states adopt targeted measures to stimulate citizens’ participation 
in municipal elections and increase turnout.160 In preparation for the 2014 European 
elections, the Commission produced a communication and recommendation aimed at 
strengthening the European dimension to European elections, increasing efficiency and 
reducing the administrative burden.161 
 
In relation to consular protection rights, the Commission has launched a dedicated 
website.162 In 2011, it also adopted a proposal for a Directive on consular protection for 
Union citizens abroad. This aims to establish clear and legally binding rules on cooperation 
and coordination between member states’ consular authorities to ensure unrepresented 
EU citizens have non-discriminatory access to consular protection from other member 
states’ diplomatic or consular representations in a third country. 
 
2. Legislative Functions of the European Parliament and the Council 
 
In the exercise of their legislative functions, the European Parliament and Council (“the 
legislature”) can be seen as protectors of citizens’ rights. As mentioned above, the Council 
may adopt provisions to strengthen or add to citizens’ rights.163 The legislature also 
promotes and protects the development and exercise of rights in a number of ways. It may 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See European Commission, On the Application of Directive 94/80/EC on the Right to Vote and to Stand as a 
Candidate in Municipal Elections by Citizens of the Union Residing in a Member State of Which They Are Not 
Nationals, at 5, COM (2012) 99 final (Mar. 9, 2012). 
161 See European Commission, Preparing for the 2014 European Elections: Further Enhancing Their Democratic 
and Efficient Conduct, COM (2013) 126 final (Mar. 12, 2013); Commission Recommendation No. 2013/142/EU, of 
12 March 2013 on Enhancing the Democratic and Efficient Conduct of the Elections to the European Parliament, 
2013 O.J. (L 79) 29. 
162  See Consular Protection for European Union Citizens Abroad, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/en/content/home (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
163 See TFEU art. 25. 
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adopt rules designed to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality.164 It may 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination on other grounds—sex, race, ethnicity, 
religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation.165 Although free movement of persons is an 
area of shared competence under Article 4(2)(a) TFEU, if action should prove necessary, 
the legislature may adopt provisions to facilitate the exercise of the right to move and 
reside.166 It is obliged to issue directives or make regulations setting out measures required 
to bring about freedom of movement of workers.167 The exercise of the right to vote is 
subject to detailed arrangements by the Council, which may provide derogations for 
specific member states. 168  On 20 December 2012, the Council adopted Directive 
2013/1/EU, making it easier for EU citizens to stand as candidates in the 2014 European 
elections by only requiring production of an identity document and eligibility 
declaration.169 The Council may adopt directives establishing cooperation and coordination 
measures necessary to facilitate diplomatic and consular protection.170 The legislature is 
obliged to adopt provisions for procedures and conditions required for the citizens’ 
initiative, as it has already done by adopting Regulation No. 211/2011.171 
 
The right to vote is a key political right that requires further consideration by the 
legislature. At the moment, non-national EU citizens residing in member states cannot vote 
in national elections as Article 20(2)(b) TFEU only provides for the right to vote in municipal 
and European Parliament elections.172 This curtails the level of democratic participation in 
their country of residence even when the individual has lived there for an extended period 
of time, perhaps establishing professional, personal, and social ties. Double voting—
namely, voting in the country of nationality as well as the country of residence—is 
                                                 
164 See id. art. 18. 
165 See id. art. 19(1). 
166 See id. art. 21(2). 
167 See id. art. 46. See also id. arts. 21(3), 48 (enumerating Council powers for social security). 
168 See id. arts. 22(1)–22(2). 
169 See Council Directive No. 2013/1/EU, of 20 December 2012 Amending Directive 93/109/EC as Regards Certain 
Detailed Arrangements for the Exercise of the Right to Stand as a Candidate in Elections to the European 
Parliament for Citizens of the Union Residing in a Member State of Which They Are Not Nationals, 2012 O.J. (L 
26), 27. 
170 See TFEU art. 23. 
171 See Commission Regulation No. 211/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 65). 
172 See TFEU art. 20(2)(b). 
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prevented under the assumption that individuals retain the right to vote in their country of 
nationality. But it may cause double jeopardy as Malta, Cyprus, Denmark, the UK, and 
Ireland apply disenfranchisement policies to nationals residing in other member states.173 
Without the right to vote in the country of residence, EU citizens would be denied a 
fundamental political right by virtue of exercising their right to free movement. This raises 
interesting questions about member state control over nationality, the substance of EU 
citizenship, and whether there is a right of choice. 
 
On the one hand, member states have discretion to determine nationality criteria, which 
may include the need to show a strong and continuing link with the country of nationality 
to benefit from national voting rights. On the other hand, political rights are fundamental 
to EU citizenship enabling democratic participation at the local, regional, national, and EU 
level. A person’s nationality is not weakened or removed when they reside in another 
member state. If this were the case, it would undermine the principle of nondiscrimination 
and allow disparity of rights throughout the EU with a notion of diminished citizenship. 
Arguably, the non-resident national may maintain stronger political ties to the country of 
nationality than a resident national. The former may actively seek to maintain the right to 
vote, whereas the latter may or may not be politically engaged by, for example, choosing 
not to vote. The reverse may also apply. A non-resident national may establish stronger 
political ties in the country of residence and therefore wish to vote in national elections 
there. A right of choice between voting in the country of nationality or country of 
residence would prevent double voting and double jeopardy. This offers a solution to 
public opinion supportive of maintaining the right to vote in the country of nationality, and 
having a right to vote in the country of residence.174 The Commission identified this as an 
area for strengthening citizenship rights under Article 25 TFEU, and recently recommended 
discontinuation of disenfranchisement policies to allow citizens the right to vote if they can 
demonstrate “a continuing interest in the political life in their country.”175 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 See R (on the application of James Alistair Preston) v. Lord President of the Council, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 1378, 
[2013] Q.B. 687 (Eng.) (rejecting a UK national’s right to vote after living in Spain for over 15 years). See also 
Parliamentary Election Act of Denmark, 2009, pt. 1(2)(3) (allowing Danish citizens leaving the country to remain 
on the electoral roll only if they have registered their intention to return within two years). 
174 In 2013, sixty-five percent of EU citizens favored not losing the right to vote in the citizen’s country of 
nationality; sixty-seven percent favored non-national EU citizens having the right to vote in the citizen’s country 
of residence. See EU Citizenship Report 2013, supra note 132, at 21–22. 
175  See id. at 24; Commission Recommendation No. 2014/53/EU of 29 January 2014, Addressing the 
Consequences of Disenfranchisement of Union Citizens Exercising Their Rights to Free Movement, 2014 O.J. (L 32) 
34. 
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D. National Parliaments’ Pre-Legislative Controls 
 
The democratic principles listed in Title II of the TEU include involvement of national 
parliaments. Article 12 TEU identifies a number of ways in which national parliaments 
“contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union”: Reviewing draft legislative acts; 
guarding subsidiarity; participating in treaty revision procedures; participating in inter-
parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament; 
notification of accession applications; evaluating policies in the area of freedom, security, 
and justice; monitoring Europol; and evaluating Eurojust.176 Protocol (No. 1) on the Role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union (“Protocol No. 1”) is intended to encourage 
greater involvement of national parliaments in EU activities and enhance their ability to 
express views on draft legislative acts and other matters.177 National parliaments enjoy the 
support and consent of EU citizens providing accountability for these functions. They have 
three treaty-based roles that can act as powerful pre-legislative controls on EU decision-
making: scrutinizing legislation; guarding subsidiarity; and exercising veto powers. 
 
I. Informed Scrutinizers 
 
Article 12(a) TEU provides that national parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the EU by being informed and receiving draft legislative acts.178 In this 
regard, EU institutions are obliged to provide the following information: (1) Commission 
consultation documents, annual legislative programs, and any other instrument of 
legislative planning or policy; (2) draft legislative acts—including Commission proposals, 
initiatives from a group of member states, initiatives from the European Parliament, 
requests from the CJEU, recommendations from the European Central Bank, and requests 
from the European Investment Bank; (3) agendas for the outcome of Council meetings, 
including minutes of meetings on draft legislative acts; and (4) Court of Auditors annual 
report.179 Once received, it is a matter for each parliament to decide how to scrutinize and 
whether to comment on proposals, especially draft legislative acts. It does, nevertheless, 
require a proactive approach in assuming the role of scrutinizer and setting up scrutiny 
mechanisms, rather than acting as a mere repository.180 In this sense, national parliaments 
                                                 
176 See TEU art. 12. 
177 See id. protocol no. 1. 
178 See id. art. 12(a). 
179 See id. protocol no. 1., arts. 1, 2, 5, 7. 
180 For a “holistic approach” to EU lawmaking and implementation involving active and responsible involvement 
by national institutions see Piqani, supra note 8, at 493. National court decisions have called for greater 
involvement of legislatures in scrutinizing EU legislation and as guardians of the balance of power between 
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take the role of informed scrutinizers, participating in EU decision-making early on to check 
for potential conflicts with domestic law and to maintain the balance of power between 
the EU and member states. 
 
The inter-parliamentary cooperation system under Protocol No. 1 encourages dialogue 
between national parliaments and the European Parliament, allowing the former to 
collectively submit “contributions” for consideration by the European Parliament, the 
Council, and the Commission. 181  These contributions are not binding on national 
parliaments and do not prejudice their positions. They are an opportunity for exchange of 
information, agenda setting, and policy coordination. The 2006 Barroso Initiative was 
launched to enable political dialogue between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments.182 In practice, it has enabled national parliaments to obtain draft legislative 
acts directly from the Commission and then to submit their opinions. This improves vertical 
political dialogue with the EU, but there is concern it is not having a similar impact on 
horizontal political dialogue between national parliaments.183 
 
While treaty provisions do not specifically state that national parliaments must act as 
informed scrutinizers, it would be counter-productive for democratically-elected 
representatives not to take up this opportunity as a means to ensure transparency and 
accountability in decision-making. Depending on the resources available, political interests, 
and importance placed on scrutiny, each parliament’s role and level of scrutiny will vary.184 
It demonstrates how EU decision-making is based on “multi-levelled democratic 
                                                                                                                             
member states and the EU. See Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 19/08, para. 165 (Czech); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - 
Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2BvE 2/08, para. 409 (June 30, 2009), 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
181 See TEU protocol no. 1. 
182 See European Commission, A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe, at 9, COM (2006) 211 final (May 
10, 2006). 
183 Adam Cygan, The Parliamentarisation of EU DecisionMaking? The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on National 
Parliaments, 36 EUR. L. REV. 480, 494–95 (2011). 
184 See European Commission, Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 3, COM (2013) 566 final 
(July 30, 2013) [hereinafter Annual Report 2012]; ADAM CYGAN, THE UK PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION 
ch. 3 (1998); Klaus Goetz & Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, The Europeanisation of National Political Systems: 
Parliaments and Executives, 3 LIVING REV. EUR. GOV. (2008), 
http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2008-2/download/lreg-2008-2Color.pdf; 
PHILIPP KILVER, THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CRITICAL VIEW ON EU CONSTITUTION BUILDING 162–63 
(2006). 
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legitimation” and the potential for elected representatives to make the EU accountable.185 
National parliaments acting as informed scrutinizers offer a degree of accountability and 
help shape public understanding of how the EU operates. 
 
II. Guardians of Subsidiarity 
 
Article 12(b) TEU provides that national parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the EU by acting as guardians of subsidiarity.186 This role is exercised in 
relation to the principle of subsidiarity under Article 5(3) TEU and the early warning system 
under Protocol No. 2.187 Except for exclusive competence areas, subsidiarity applies to all 
shared or supported competence decisions. It determines at which level decisions should 
be made when there are multiple levels of decision-making authority—for example, local, 
regional, national, or supranational. In accordance with the Preamble and Article 1 
paragraph 2 TEU and the Preamble to Protocol No. 2, decisions should be taken as closely 
as possible to EU citizens, reinforcing the idea of democratic accountability.188 
 
1. Two-Stage Test for Subsidiarity 
 
Article 5(3) TEU provides a two-stage test of necessity and effectiveness for subsidiarity: 
EU action must be necessary because the proposed action’s objectives cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by member states; and, due to the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, the objectives would be more effectively achieved by the EU.189 “Multi-leveled 
democratic legitimation” is apparent with involvement of EU institutions and national 
parliaments.190 Decisions by EU institutions must take into account subsidiarity and 
demonstrate both how objectives for a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
member states, and the extent or results of the proposed action means it is better 
achieved by the EU. This conforms with the requirement under Article 5 Protocol No. 2 for 
                                                 
185 Mattias Wendel, Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 7 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 96, 117 (2011). See 
also Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Nov. 26, 2008], 
sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 19/08, para. 173 (Czech); Ústavní soud České republiky ze dne 03.11.2009 (ÚS) [Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Nov. 3, 2009], sp.zn. Pl. ÚS 29/09, para. 138. 
186 See TEU art. 12(b). 
187 See id. art. 5(3); id. protocol no. 2. 
188 See id. Preamble; id. art. 1; id. protocol no. 2, Preamble. 
189 See European Commission, On Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 2, COM (2008) 586 final (Sept. 26, 2008). 
For a single test approach, see Derrick Wyatt, Could a Yellow Card for National Parliaments Strengthen Judicial as 
Well as Political Policing of Subsidiarity, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL’Y 1, (2006). 
190 Wendel, supra note 185, at 117. 
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subsidiarity appraisal of draft legislative acts, and the oversight role entrusted to national 
parliaments under Article 6.191 
 
Necessity and effectiveness must both be satisfied so that EU action may be a matter of 
degree rather than absoluteness. Member states’ action in a shared competence area may 
prove insufficient to tackle a cross-border dimension. An example is the 2012 Commission 
Proposal for a Regulation on the Right to Collective Strike (“Monti II Regulation”) intended 
to tackle cross-border dimensions to the right to collective action in relation to the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.192 
 
Member states and the EU have applied the test differently. There is a debate around a 
broad interpretation with a presumption against EU action and a restrictive interpretation 
in accordance with necessity and effectiveness without reference to proportionality.193 
Treaty provisions support the latter approach where national parliaments are granted an 
oversight role only for subsidiarity and not proportionality, which is a matter for EU 
institutions to apply. Based on the Commission’s 2012 Report, national parliaments regard 
subsidiarity as a legal principle subject to different interpretations and outcomes.194 The 
Commission published its own practice in applying standard criteria as guidance for 
national parliaments.195 While recognizing the benefit of having standard compliance 
criteria, national parliaments want to maintain a margin of discretion. Political 
opportunism may influence subsidiarity monitoring to the detriment of a more strict 
application of the two-stage test to focus on the merits of a proposed legislative act.196 
                                                 
191 See TEU protocol no. 2, arts. 5–6. 
192 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action Within the Context of 
the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services, at 8, COM (2012) 130 final (Mar. 21, 2012). 
For the background to this proposal, see Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market (May 9, 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf; 
European Commission, Towards a Single Market Act: For a Highly Competitive Social Market Economy, COM 
(2010) 623 (Oct. 27, 2010). 
193 For a restrictive interpretation, see Federico Fabbrini & Katarzyna Granat, Yellow Card, But No Foul: The Role 
of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on 
the Right to Strike, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 115 (2013). For a broad interpretation, see Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: 
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Nevertheless, if exercised properly, subsidiarity monitoring under the early warning system 
offers national parliaments a pre-legislative control over decision-making. 
 
2. The Early Warning System 
 
The early warning system (“EWS”), under which national parliaments monitor subsidiarity 
compliance, is established by Protocol No. 2 with two distinct procedures: The “yellow 
card” procedure, under Article 7(2), obliges review of draft legislation deemed non-
compliant by national parliaments; and the “orange card” procedure, under Article 7(3), 
obliges review and, under certain conditions, withdrawal of the proposal.197 When an EU 
institution proposes a draft legislative act, this must be forwarded to all national 
parliaments with a detailed statement of the following: Compliance with subsidiarity and 
proportionality; assessment of financial impact; in the case of directives, implications for 
rules to be put in place by member states, including regional legislation; reasons for 
concluding that an EU objective can be better achieved at EU level, with qualitative and, 
where possible, quantitative indicators; and how any financial or administrative burden on 
the EU, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators, and 
citizens will be minimized and commensurate with the objective to be achieved.198 
 
National parliaments have eight weeks to scrutinize the draft legislative act, affording a 
degree of pre-legislative control over EU decision-making. During this period, the Council is 
not permitted to place the draft legislative act on its provisional agenda for adoption. After 
eight weeks, an additional period of ten days must elapse between placing the draft 
legislative act on the Council’s provisional agenda and the adoption of a position. In an 
urgent case where a draft legislative act needs to be agreed upon within the eight-week 
period, the Council must give reasons for its position.199 If a national parliament considers 
the draft act does not comply with subsidiarity, it must submit a “reasoned opinion” to the 
Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, or Commission, depending on who 
initiated the draft. 
 
Unlike the detailed statement attached to draft legislative acts, national parliaments are 
not required to provide a detailed explanation in their reasoned opinions. A statement of 
why the draft legislative act does not comply with subsidiarity will suffice.200 Reasoned 
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opinions can vary in substantive content and interpretation of subsidiarity.201 Such a wide 
margin of discretion counters arguments about the weakness of subsidiarity monitoring—
namely, lack of resources or adequate time to consider proposals. It may also help foster 
horizontal political dialogue between national parliaments to coordinate their 
responses.202 Some may be reluctant to challenge their government’s position with a 
perceived lack of electoral benefit in doing so.203 But this is a matter for member states’ 
domestic accountability systems, which would exist irrespective of the opportunity to act 
as guardians of subsidiarity. 
 
2.1 Obligation to Review 
 
Under the yellow card procedure, reasoned opinions count as votes and, if one third of all 
national parliaments’ votes conclude the draft legislation is non-compliant with 
subsidiarity, the initiating institution must review it. For draft legislative acts submitted 
under Article 76 TFEU on the area of freedom, security, and justice, the review threshold is 
one quarter of all national parliaments’ votes.204 The initiating body “may decide to 
maintain, amend, or withdraw” the draft legislation.205 There is no obligation for it to be 
withdrawn, but reasons must be given for any decision, ensuring accountability through 
transparent and open decision-making. 
 
This procedure was used for the first time in 2012 in relation to the Monti II Regulation 
with twelve reasoned opinions from national parliaments, representing nineteen votes, 
against the Commission’s proposal.206 The Commission had consulted widely with relevant 
stakeholders and provided a detailed statement of subsidiarity compliance. But national 
parliaments considered the proposal did not comply with subsidiarity with reasons ranging 
from the legal basis of the proposal under Article 352 TFEU to non-compliance with 
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proportionality. 207  The Commission reviewed the proposal but found no breach of 
subsidiarity. In a remarkable concession to political accountability, it “took note of the 
views expressed by national parliaments” and recognized that the draft regulation “was 
unlikely to gather the necessary political support within the European Parliament and 
Council to enable adoption.”208 The Commission withdrew the Monti II Regulation on 26 
September 2012.209 This shows that simply attaining the review threshold can exert 
political influence. Even then, if the institution finds compliance with subsidiarity, pursuing 
legislation may be unwise if it is likely to encounter member state resistance. Some argue 
this sets a bad precedent for misuse of subsidiarity monitoring as the Commission found 
no breach of subsidiarity.210 But it reflects how national parliaments act as pre-legislative 
filters testing political appetite before the Council and European Parliament make a 
decision. 
 
Representing a cross-section of society with a mandate to probe legislation in the wider 
public interest, parliamentarians engage in information-gathering, debates, deliberations, 
and in-depth reports or inquiries. These activities legitimize the decision-making process by 
being receptive to opposing views, competing interests, appraisal of socio-economic 
impacts, and consultation with relevant stakeholders.211 In this sense, the filtering role is 
constitutionally protected in member states,212 and a legitimate form of democratic 
accountability is provided under the Treaties. 
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2.2 Obligation to Withdraw 
 
The orange card procedure relates to Commission proposals for legislation under the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Where a simple majority of votes of national parliaments 
find non-compliance with subsidiarity, the Commission must review the proposal. Similar 
to the yellow card, the Commission “may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw” it.213 
Unlike the yellow card, however, if the Commission decides to keep the proposal, it will 
have to justify that proposal in a reasoned opinion which, along with national parliaments’ 
reasoned opinions, must be submitted to the European Parliament and the Council. They 
must then follow a two-stage process: First, reviewing subsidiarity compliance while taking 
into account reasoned opinions of national parliaments and the Commission; and second, 
withdrawing the proposal if either institution decides by a threshold number—fifty-five 
percent of Council members or a majority of votes in the European Parliament—that the 
proposal is non-compliant.214 
 
One criticism leveled against the EWS is that it does not have a “red card” procedure, 
effectively a veto power, for national parliaments.215 The Working Group IV on the Role of 
National Parliaments, however, focused on ensuring effective early participation in scrutiny 
of legislation rather than setting up mechanisms for legislative delays. Constitutionally, 
national parliaments are not part of the EU legislature and the Working Group was 
concerned to maintain institutional balance.216 A veto power could frustrate decision-
making without adding any value to its effectiveness at the appropriate level. It may also 
exacerbate weak monitoring due to lack of time and resources. More stringent scrutiny 
requirements, including those for reasoned opinions, would be necessary to counter 
positions of the Council and the European Parliament in order to prevent legislation 
passing, potentially affecting the separation of powers within member states. 
 
III. Veto Powers 
 
National parliaments have an accountability brake, effectively a veto, under Article 48(7) 
TEU, the passerelle clause.217 Under this clause the European Council may adopt a decision 
                                                 
213 See TEU protocol no. 2, art. 7(3). 
214 See id. art. 7(3)(a)–(b). 
215 EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, SUBSIDIARITY, NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE LISBON TREATY, 2007-8, H.C. 563, para. 
36 (U.K.). 
216 COUNCIL OF EUROPE WORKING GROUP IV, FINAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP IV ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, 
CONV 353/02, paras. 21–26, 33 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
217 See TEU art. 48(7). 
778 G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   Vol. 16 No. 04 
authorizing the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority voting instead of 
unanimity, or under the ordinary legislative procedure instead of a special legislative 
procedure.218 But the European Council is obliged to inform national parliaments at least 
six months before any such decision is adopted.219 If, within this period, a single national 
parliament makes known its opposition, the decision will not be adopted. Thus, any 
national parliament of a member state, acting on its own, can veto changes to voting 
procedures. They are not obliged to exercise this veto, and, in the absence of any 
opposition, the European Council may adopt the decision. An active, well-informed, and 
democratically-engaged parliament, however, should at least be aware of this power and 
its potential as a mechanism to hold EU institutions accountable for how they make 
decisions. The European Council does not exercise legislative functions and is a political 
body composed of heads of state or governments of member states that sets the EU’s 
political directions and priorities. 220  In this respect, for national parliaments, being 
informed about vetoing voting procedure changes is a step toward holding prime ministers 
and presidents accountable for how they make decisions at this level. 
 
Another veto power of national parliaments relates to the area of freedom, security, and 
justice. Specifically in relation to aspects of family law with cross-border implications, the 
Commission may propose the Council of Ministers adopt a decision to determine which 
aspects may be the subject of acts adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Before any decision is taken, however, national parliaments must be notified of such a 
proposal and if a single national parliament opposes within six months of receiving the 
notification, the decision is not adopted.221 As with Article 48(7) TEU, exercise of the veto 
does not require acting in concert with others; one parliament’s opposition is enough for 
the decision to fail.222 The difference with this provision is that it actually involves national 
parliaments deciding on a competence issue, albeit a limited one relating to cross-border 
family law matters, rather than voting procedures. In exercising this power, national 
parliaments review whether a given family law matter should come under supranational 
decision-making. A seemingly discrete area of law could attract high levels of public 
interest on issues such as child abduction, protection of children’s rights, and even mutual 
recognition of same-sex relationships, which would all require cooperation between 
member states. Equally, aspects of family law may be too sensitive and form part of 
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national identity such that member states will want to maintain their decision-making 
autonomy.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
EU treaties are international treaties by which member states agree to be bound once they 
formalize national consent through ratification. Both at the candidate stage and 
throughout membership, states are obliged to implement legislation and amend laws to 
comply with EU law. Member states have used a range of domestic pre-legislative controls 
on consent, especially as regards membership enlargement or major treaty revisions. Prior 
parliamentary approval, either in the form of statute enactment or formal vote, is the most 
prevalent form of pre-legislative control. Even in Germany and Poland, with an advanced 
understanding of democratic participation and constitutional provisions on referendums 
respectively, referendums are still not invoked as a pervasive pre-legislative control. 
 
By contrast, the UK’s EU Act makes future EU law not only subject to parliamentary 
approval, but also to a referendum. Such extensive use of referendums is a clumsy brake 
on internal voting procedures, hindering efficient decision-making and representing a 
hollow sense of empowerment for citizens. Voting on technical areas can lead to voter 
apathy, low turnouts, and further distancing the public from EU matters. It is far more 
important to hold governments and EU institutions accountable by granting the public 
access to information on government voting positions and their basis, while still giving the 
public a right to vote on more substantive matters. Ironically, the UK is precipitating a 
wider democratic deficit in the EU by effectively vetoing the opportunity for other member 
states to progress towards further integration. This is counterproductive as it raises doubts 
about the UK’s ability to act in good faith, leading to isolation and loss of the credibility to 
influence decision-making. Alternatively, the other twenty-seven member states could 
decide to develop closer integration measures excluding the UK so that EU decision-making 
is not adversely affected. 
 
Constitutional principles of citizenship, democracy, and political rights further democratic 
accountability. Supranational decision-making is based on a representative democracy with 
direct and indirect accountability to citizens in member states. The right to participate in 
the democratic life of the EU and democratic principles of transparency and open decision-
making make this possible. However, recent examples of citizen-based initiatives under 
Article 11(4) TEU illustrate the limitations of popular vote decision-making where there is 
lack of understanding of EU law and potential for initiatives to be hijacked by narrow 
political interests.223 Of far greater significance is the CJEU’s recognition that effective 
participation in the political life of the EU includes the right of citizens and national 
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parliamentarians to access information regarding member states’ negotiating positions 
and proposals for legislative amendments. The EU’s protector role in upholding rights, 
especially through the Commission’s oversight responsibilities and the legislative functions 
of the European Parliament and the Council, justifies supranational decision-making. An 
internal system of accountability exists with the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers approving the Commission’s legislative proposals. 
 
It is in the area of scrutinizing draft legislative acts and proposals that national parliaments 
can have the greatest impact on accountability. Representing one of the few mechanisms 
for direct accountability to elected representatives of member states, subsidiarity 
monitoring under the EWS is a powerful pre-legislative control with the potential to block 
legislation. Member states’ approach to the subsidiarity test varies, as does the substance 
of their reasoned opinions. But this is partly due to lack of uniform scrutiny requirements, 
and a desire to maintain a margin of discretion. Defeat of the proposed Monti II Regulation 
shows what can be achieved when national parliaments coordinate reasoned opinions, and 
act as filters testing political appetite for new legislation. Representing a cross-section of 
society with a mandate to probe legislation in the wider public interest, parliamentarians 
engaged in a variety of scrutiny activities legitimize the decision-making process, thus 
fulfilling a national constitutional and treaty-based role. 
